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In this paper we develop a model of patronage where the king’s subjects exert a decentralized social sanction
on the dissidents. We are able to show that depending on the succession rule in case of a revolution, the optimal
co-optation strategy of the king diﬀers. When the succeding king is the strongest revolutionary, the actual king
co-opts the weakest among the potential opponents. When any member of the clientele has a claim on the
throne, however, the actual king has two distinct co-optation strategies. He either approaches his most powerful
subjects, in which case the size of the clientele is relatively modest but the clients’ individual price is relatively
high, or else he randomly co-opts subjects to contain the bargaining power of his clients. The ambiguity as to
the optimal strategy rests in that in this latter scenario the size of the clientele is larger.
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1 Introduction
Rare are the instances in human history where people have been able to choose their leaders by means of genunily
direct and fair elections. Certainly, the number of democratic states has reached unprecedented levels, but several
countries keep on being ruled by powerful oligarchs who often seem to beneﬁt from their people’s support. No
single formula can be used to explain the survival of non-democratic regimes, but they do usually have as a
common deminator the control of brute force and a grip on the country’s wealth. And while some of these states
- such as North Korea or Zimbabwe - rely essentially on the former tool to maintain the population disciplined,
a vast majority of non-democratic leaders give more emphasis to the peaceful co-optation strategy backed by
some military might. Buying support through material transfers constitutes current currency in many sub-saharan
countries (Azam, 1995) as well as in clan-led places like Afghanistan (Giustozzi and Ullah, 2006) or the Palestinian
territories (Livingstone and Halevy, 1990). Despite the abundance of the literature on patronage (e.g. Sahlins,
1963; Platteau, 1995a; 1995b, Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; North et al., 2007) , few eﬀorts have been made to
understand the identity of the favours beneﬁciaries. The core objective of the present paper is to shed some light
this question.
To tackle this issue, the starting point is probably the observation that ‘dictators are dictators because they
cannot win elections’ (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006) given the clientelistic policies they pursue. Indeed, the elites
aim at preserving the rents they enjoy in non-democratic settings (North et al., 2007), and have therefore no
incentive to permit the median voter to decide the society’s wealth partition. A by-product of this observation
is that in a context of non-perfectly functioning democratic institutions, if the central power fails to comply with
the opposition’s demands, the latter will use violent actions to change the leader’s mind, or his head (Roemer,
1985; De Nardo, 1985; Ginkel and Smith, 1999; Perez, 2004; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006), instead of expressing
its disagreement through the ballot box. To remain in power in such a context, the central regime may develop a
strong repressive apparatus, it may co-opt key players in the opposition movement, or combine both instruments.
Much attention has been given to those various strategies, as well as to the relative eﬃciency of each tool, with some
authors putting more emphasis on the stick (Roemer, 1985; Wintrobe, 1998; Bhavnani and Ross, 2003, Ginkel and
Smith, 1999, or Bates et al., 2002), others on the carrot (Olson, 1993; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003 and Padro
I Miquel, 2006), and still others on a mixture of the two devices (De Nardo, 1985; Treisman, 1999; Acemoglu and1 INTRODUCTION 3
Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Fjelde and Hegre, 2006, as well as the vast
litterature on rent seeking and the resource curse). In this paper we ﬁx the repressive capacity of the central power
and focus on the patronage strategy that, as we show, is not uniquely deﬁned.
Patron-client relationships can be understood as an asymmetric exchange where-by the recipient of a gift vows
allegiance to the patron by rewarding the latter with his support and thus increasing the transferers’ power (Homans
1961; Blau 1964; Wintrobe 1998; Platteau and Sekeris, 2007, Konrad, 2007). Indeed, material goods may be traded
against allegiance since the payback may take a form diﬀerent from the medium of the original favour (Ekeh 2004:
35). Commodities may thus be exchanged against symbolic attributes such as social prestige and political power: a
material gift, which never goes un-repaid, can thus be reciprocated, say, by a demonstration of loyalty, allegiance,
homage, respect, subordination, devotion, etc...
A careful look at places structured along patron-client relashionships captures our attention for the following
three reasons. The ﬁrst and most striking observation regards the disproportionately small number of agents
the ruler patronizes as compared to the size of the community (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; North et al.,
2007). A second calling point regards the non-uniqueness of the optimal co-optation strategies since the strongest
subjects may or may not be systematically granted favours by the king. We may nevertheless identify a recurrent
characteristic of patron-client relationships: the general populace is typically excluded from the pool of privileges’
beneﬁciaries.
This last observation is perhaps less perplexing than the two previous ones. To the extent that a patron seeks
to increase his power through co-optation, it is obvious that the weakest elements of a society are unlikely to
be granted any favour. Indeed, several authors have underlined the lower strata’s (peasants, workers, migrants)
inability to coordinate their actions, hence resulting in their subordination to and exploitation by elites (De Nardo,
1985; Bendix, 1980; Collier, 2008). Regarding the rest of the community, however, alternative strategies have
historically been used to fuel patronage networks. The most intuitive pattern is perhaps the one where autocratic
rulers have recursively relied on local strong men to dominate their people (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; North
et al., 2007). A diametrically opposed strategy consists in purposefuly sidelining the most dangerous opponents
rather than having them gathered in the king’s court. Such a pattern has been observed in environments where
the ruling’s individual power was essential in making him the head of the group. Examples of this strategy may1 INTRODUCTION 4
be found in environments dominated by power politics (see for instance Reno, 2004 for examples of African weak
states), and Lake’s (2006) analysis provides us with interesting applications to international politics. A still diﬀerent
bribing strategy consists in dividing and ruling by dispatching favours in a volatile manner (Acemoglu et al., 2004).
The divide and rule strategy consiste in reducing the clients’ importance by making their position insecure
through the threat of replacement. Mobutu in Zaire (Reno, 2004), Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (Acemoglu
et al., 2004), or Stalin in the USSR (Solzhenitsyn, 1973) were able to diminish the individual weight of any single
regime supporter by applying such co-optation techniques. Similar strategies of patronage politics have been used
by Castro in Cuba, Chavez in Venezuela, or Ahmadinejad in Iran1. These populist strong men have departed from
their predecesors’ policies of co-opting the country’s strongmen by precisely sidelining part of the inﬂuential people’s
body and relying on a wider group of individuals.
Alternatively, a much more hierarchized co-optation strategy may be applied. Jackson and Rosberg (1984)
use the notion of ‘personal rule’ to characterize the behaviour of patrons whose support lies in the hands of a few
powerful clients: ‘personal rule is an elitist political system composed of the privileged and powerful few in which the
many are usually unmobilized, unorganized, and therefore relatively powerless to command the attention and action
of government’ (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984: 423). This strategy which consists in co-opting the strongest local Big
Men (Polanyi, 1944; Breman, 1974; Platteau, 1995a) confers, however, signiﬁcant bargaining power to the clients.
Indeed, when allowing for a particular subject to be a basic ingredient of the regime’s stability, the ruler improves
his clients’ exit opportunities and therefore reduces his own bargaining power. Hence, while non-democratic rulers
may have an incentive to secure the support of a limited number of powerful subjects, the individual cost of such
clients may create incentives to seek alternative co-optation strategies.
Underlying the two above mentioned strategies, namely the strategic selection of the most powerful subjects,
and the populist approach of co-opting weaker agents as well, is the fact that the clients have a claim on the ruler’s
wealth in case the latter fails to satisfy them. The clients prospects, however, need not necessarily be so. Indeed,
the beneﬁts from successfully opposing the king may in fact be enjoyed by a very limited number of relatively strong
subjects.
The former assumption of all clients beneﬁting from a successfull uprising is an underlying assumption in North
1In these latter examples the people’s material conditions have been much more humane. The reason may lie in the rulers’ smaller
coercive capacity.1 INTRODUCTION 5
et al.’s (2007) understanding of the way non-democratic states (natural states in their terminology) are organized.
According to their theory, the elites collude in a dominant coalition that ‘manipulates the rest of society to create
incentives for powerful members of the coalition to limit their use of violence’ (North et al., 2007: 20). The elites are
therefore assumed to maximize the coalition’s payoﬀ by acting cooperatively ‘under the aegis of the state [which]
enhances the elite return from society’s productive resources - land, labor, capital, and organizations (North et al.,
2007: 23-24). In this paper we explore both hypotheses and analyze the respective implications in terms of clients
selection by the ‘King’.
When the successor of a deposed king is knwon ex-ante, however, the subjects’ motivations are radically modiﬁed
since the only beneﬁt from opposing the ruler rests in the expressiveutility of making know one’s own disagreement
with the king. Categorizing the international system along these ligns seems to be a fair assumption since whenever
the regional or world domination has been successfully contested, the successor has proved to be the strongest
survivor in the system. After the First Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), Japan emerged as the sole regional power,
while in the aftermath of Napoleon’ humuliating defeat in Waterloo, the English empire established itself as the
uncontestable superpower. Similarly, among the consequences of the elimination of the Nazi threat in 1945 we
account the establishment of the United States, and of the Soviet Union as the unique patrons in their (well
delimited) respective spheres of inﬂuence. When considering the players’ relationships in the international arena,
alliances of the strongest players can be deemed more an oddity than a regularity. Washington’s policy nowadays,
to cite one example, has consisted in co-opting middle inﬂuence countries around the globe rather than securing
the (costly) allegiance of China, Russia, or Iran. The succession rule should therefore be deterministic in the way
a patron selects his clients.
While our main objective is to better understand the various co-optation strategies, we are equally concerned with
the perplexing observation that the ruling elites often represent a disproportionately small share of the population
(Bueno De Mesquita et al, 2003; North et al., 2007), both in terms of numbers, and of aggregate power. The
Febuary 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, for instance, revealed the incapacity of the Czar to discipline his subjects in
times of massive uproar. In the same vein, Louis XVI would not have been overthrown (and later beheaded), nor
would the Shah of Iran have been forced to exile, or Ceausescu been killed, if their respective regimes possessed
a military power strong enough to overwhelm a large scale insurrection. Nevertheless, the coercive power of these1 INTRODUCTION 6
regimes was suﬃcient to have secured long periods of political stability despite the capacity of the mob to overthrow
their respective ruler. The litterature on patronage and clientelism (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gaspart and
Platteau, 2003; Platteau, 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Padro I Miquel, 2006) partly
explains these regimes’ survival ability. A complementary explanation can contribute to understand the modest
size of the ruling coalitions.
The preferred argument in the litterature is that the masses are profoundly exposed to the collective action
problem of free ridding (Olson, 1965). The subjects’ incentives not to contribute to the costly rebellion allows the
kleptocrat to exploit the masses. In such contexts, Olson (1993) observed that “it is a logical mistake to suppose
that because the subjects of an autocrat suﬀer from his exactions, they will overthrow him. The same logic of
collective action that ensures the absence of social contracts in the historical record whereby large groups agreed to
obtain advantages of government also implies that the masses will not overthrow an autocrat simply because they
would be better oﬀ if they did so.”
Rather than referring to the free riding problem, in the present model we consider situations where subjects
refrain from opposing the regime out of fear of beeing sidelined by their pairs. We build on Timur Kuran’s (1989;
1995) theory of preference falsiﬁcation2 where the agents’ utility is composed of three components: the intrinsic,
the reputational, and the expressive utility. In short Kuran’s argument goes as follows: an agent publicly expresses
a view at odds with his personal beliefs, because of the social pressures he anticipates were he to act otherwise.
The reason is to be sought in the components of the net utility an agent derives from the public expression of
a viewpoint. Kuran distinguishes between the intrinsic utility of one’s public choice, that is the direct utility he
would receive if his personal choice turned out to be the society’s choice, the expressive utility of it, i.e. the personal
gratiﬁcation one experiences from making public his opinion, and the reputational utility, that measures the eﬀect
the other agents’ viewpoint on one’s expressed opinion has on one’s own well being. I may for instance publicly
2Kuran’s idea can be traced back to Granovetter (1978) who develops a threshold model that sheds light on the observation that
‘collective outcomes can seem paradoxical, i.e. intuitively inconsistent with the intentions of the individuals who generate them’. More
precisely, in a situation of strategic interaction featuring many agents, provided a certain threshold concerning some action(s) is not
reached, we may observe individuals picking an action opposed to their genuine preferences regarding the act itself because of the costs
imposed by other individuals when acting in a diﬀerent way. Lohmann (1994) also follows a similar path to the one of Granovetter. She
integrates the informational cascades theory (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) in her model, thus departing from the pure idea of preference
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state that my preferred colour is pink, even though I abhor it (intrinsic utility), simply because, if I disclose in
‘pinkland’ my distaste for their cherished colour, I would be regarded as extremely odd (reputational utility), while,
on the other hand, I feel no particular urge to make known my preference for blue (expressive utility).
In this paper we assume the agents’ utility to possess the three components identiﬁed by Kuran. The subjects
are asymmetrically endowed with some power/force that can be used to overthrow the ruler. By introducing the
players’ force in an exogenous manner we forego the conﬂict side of the coin in order to understand more in depth the
patron-client relationships. Protesting against the central regime enhances one’s reputation, which in turn aﬀects
positively the players’ utility. The resulting expressive utility of demonstrating is assumed to be a positive function
of one’s power since stronger individuals’ actions are likely to be more visible than the opposition exerted by weaker
agents (Emiliano Zapata in Mexico, James Connolly in Ireland, or Martin Luther King in the United States have all
managed to obtain such respect and esteem through their actions that their names remain carved in History). On
the other hand, demonstrating entails reputational costs. This ‘reputational utility’ is a ‘second order punishment
scheme’ (Bowles, 2002) stressing that if some agent does not openly criticize the regime he must denounce those
who do for, should he not, he is assimilated to the authority’s challengers and treated as such (Kuran, 1995). Such
decentralized collective punishments need not necessarily be formal sanctions. This brings to mind Frank’s (1996)
remark that there is a ‘universal desire for human approval’ that will make one avoid voicing against the prevalent
opinion3. The king decides whether and how to grant favours to his subjects in the knowledge that if the agents
protesting manage to reach some critical revolutionary mass he will be toppled.
In order to gauge the implications of the alternative succession schemes exposed earlier, the analysis is partitioned
in two sections. In a ﬁrst part we assume that when a revolution succeeds, the strongest rebelling individual becomes
the new king. The inability of the king to commit on future gifts implies that the subjects have no incentive in
coordinating their actions to topple the ruler. We are able to show that the optimal co-optation strategy for the
king then consists in delivering personalized gifts to the weakest potential opponents. In the second section we
allow for any client of the king to have a likelihood of replacing the latter in case of a revolution. This creates
3Referring again to the social psychology literature, note that Deutsch and Gerard (1955, cited in Leyens and Yserbyt, 1997) point
at the social pressure one is exposed to when deviating from the group’s viewpoint, while Kelman (1958, cited in Leyens and Yserbyt,
1997) considers that the individuals obey a source of inﬂuence that masters rewards and punishments, hence their willingness to convey
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scope for the subjects to coordinate their actions. In this latter scenario the bargaining power of the clients is thus
enhanced, and we are able to distinguish two distinct equilibrium strategies from the king’s viewpoint. The ruler
may develop a ‘personal rule’ and exclusively bribe the Big Men of his polity, in which case few subjects need to
be co-opted at a high individual price. The king may alternatively decide to cut the clients’ bargaining power by
randomly selecting them. This ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy is quite diﬀerent from the one proposed by Acemoglu et
al. (2004) since the opposition’s power is diminished by eﬀective random bribes to some clients rather than by the
threat of destroying any collective action among the potential rebels. Lastly, in a concluding section we discuss the
results of the model.
2 The domination of the ﬁercest.
2.1 The Setting
We consider an inﬁnitely repeated game with one Leader, L, and n subjects, where N denotes the set of subjects
(N = {1,2,...,n}). Each agent is endowed with one unit of time that he inelastically allocates at each time period
to the productive activity, or to protesting/rebelling. At every time period the king decides the vector of productive
resources to transfer to his subjects, ~ x = (x1,x2 ...xn). Recipient i is thus in possession of r
t−1
i +xt




i = r. These transfers are irrevocable by the leader; only a revolution can modify the distribution
of productive resources, in which case all the community’s resources end up in the hands of the new ruler. After
the privileges have been distributed, the subjects decide whether to transform their resources in consummables
using a one-to-one production technology, or to join the rebellion, in which case they forego production. When
subjects decide to join the protest, their individual contribution to the general outcome is heterogenous. Subject
i’s power/force equals pi, and the total force of the protesters equals FP =
P
i∈P pi, where P designates the subset
of subjects protesting. The players’ power is independently and uniformly distributed accross the population over
the interval [0, ¯ p]. If the movement’s power exceeds some revolutionary critical force Π, the regime collapses and
the strongest revolutionary replaces the actual king. Otherwise the leader stays in power with unit probability.
Whenever the opposition movement is contained at the level of a protest (i.e. FP < Π), the opponents to the
central regime derive an expressive utility by making public their opposition to the leader. This utility component2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 9
the protesters enjoy is assumed to equal the pressure they exert on the central power, pi. If, however, the protest
mutates in a revolution, the revolutionaries’ expressive utility drops to zero since the ruler being immediately ousted,
the very act of protesting is less visible. The third component of the subjects’ utility is given by their reputational
utility. When a proportion π of the community takes the streets, and FP < Π, the remaining (1 − π)n agents
apply a social sanction on the protesters in order to avoid any potential confusion regarding their support to the
central government. The protesters’ utility is thereby reduced in time t by an amount z(πt), where
∂z(π
t)
∂πt < 0. If
the protest mutates in a revolution, the social pressure against the protesters disappears and the deposed leader’s




In a last stage of the current time period, the agents consume their production and we next move on to period






i, ∀i, while in the
converse situation a new leader is picked out of the revolutionary movement’s members.
Subject i’s instantaneous utility can thus be written as:
ut
i = xt
i − z(1 − πt) if i does not rebel (1)
ut





A graphical support may help ﬁx the ideas at this stage. On Figure (1) we show how a revolution occurs when the
ruler takes no action to prevent it (i.e. if the leader co-opts no subject). The graph features a discontinuous concave
curve that stands for the reputational (dis)utility, which reaches its maximum when the subjects all conform to either
supporting the king, or opposing him. The negatively sloped line depicts the power of each subject, ranked from
the strongest to the weakest. The shaded area Π/n represents the revolutionary critical force that the protesters
must exceed for a revolution to occur. Bearing in mind that all information is common knowledge, the πa strongest
subjects are expected to rebel, irrespectively of the other subjects’ decision. Indeed, since the king is assumed not
to have co-opted anyone, all the individuals whose expressive utility from rebelling (pi) is higher to the expected
social pressure (z(0)) become dissidents. This in turn implies that the expected social sanction is no more equal
to z(0), but rather adjusted to z(πa). Hence, the next (πb − πa)% more powerful subjects are also expected to
join the opposition’s ranks. Since, however, the πbn strongest agents’ strength (area 0¯ pbπb) exceeds the critical
revolutionary mass (area 0¯ pAB), the leader is thrown out of oﬃce.2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 10
Figure 1: Mutation of a protest in a revolution in the absence of co-optation.
Summing up, if we neglect for notational convenience the time superscripts, the timing of the period-model is
the following:
1. The leader chooses a vector of resources gifts, ~ x = (x1,x2 ...xn).
2. The subjects simultaneously decide whether to join the protest and forego the productive activity or not.
3. The players obtain their period utilities. If FP > Π, a revolution occurs, the ruler loses his a authority and a
new leader selected among the pool of revolutionaries becomes the new king in the subsequent time period.
Otherwise, the same ruler remains in place.
Bear in mind that in this section the new ruler, in case of revolution, is the strongest revolutionary, an assumption
that we later lift.
2.2 Analysis
The natural equilibrium candidate for a repeated game is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). Because of the
complexities this equilibrium notion involves when dealing with inﬁnitely repeated games, we choose to focus on
the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) that constitutes a subset of the SPE set. While the latter only requires
that the players’ strategies are Nash in every proper subgame, the MPE possesses the additional feature that at2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 11
any time period only the payoﬀ-relevant history should matter. And since all the payoﬀ-relevant history in time t
is captured by a state variable St, the MPE is a SPE conditioned on the state variable. More formally,
Deﬁnition: A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a proﬁle of strategies σ that are perfect equilibrium and are
measurable with respect to the payoﬀ-relevant history (Ht(ht) = Ht(¯ ht) ⇒ ∀i,σt
i(ht) = σt
i(¯ ht)) (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991: 515).





Agent i’s objective is to choose a strategy Σi = (σ0
i ,σ1
i ...σ∞
i ) that maximizes his inter-temporal utility for any
given strategy of the n remaining agents. For a constant (and identical accross agents) discount rate of δ, the























where Vi(S) is the value for function for i under state S, while T(.) gives the probability that some particular
state is realised in the next time period. Following our hypotheses the transition process possesses a deterministic
characteristic that signiﬁcantly easens the analysis. Whenever a revolution fails, St+1 = St with unit probability.
An interesting feature of the MPE is that we solve the game by proceeding backwardsly inside any time period.
We thus start by determining whether a revolution occurs or not in the last stage. When FP < Π, the only subjects
that do join the protest are the ones whose expressive utility of protesting is higher to the associated reputational
utility. If, however, FP ≥ Π, all resourceless subjects join the rebellion since failing to do so would only burden

































Having fully described the subjects’ equilibrium strategy in time t we can climb up the decision tree and elucidate
stage (1) which consists in the leader selecting the vector of personal gifts (r1,r2 ...rn) to provide. The problem of2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 12



























If the ruler fails to discipline his subjects, VL(S
0
) = 0, the ruler takes his exit option forever after with unit
probability, exit option assumed to be nil. In that case, the leader’s problem is to maximize his instantaneous
utility, and this is achieved by setting rt
1 = rt
2 ... = rt
n = 0, hence Ui = rt.
If, however, the ruler succeeds in averting the revolution from taking place, VL(S
0
) = VL(S). For this scenario
to arise the ruler must make sure that FP ≤ Π.
Consider the following obvious result:
Result 1. If FP|~ x={0,0,...0} ≤ Π, the leader rules without transfers.
If (i) the ruler distributes no private beneﬁts, (ii) pi < z(0), and (iii) FP ≤ Π, the ruler needs not take any





The subjects receive no productive resources, while the most powerful individuals obtain a positive (expressive)
utility from exerting some resistance. This result is due to a combination of weak, comparatively to the central
power, subjects, and/or an eﬃcient decentralized punishment.
Result 2. If FP|~ x={0,0,...0} > Π and @~ x
0
such that FP|~ x




i6=L ≤ δr, then a revolution occurs at each
time period.
This 2nd result, the proof of which is in the Appendix, states that if a vector of gifts that succeds in both (i)
making a revolution impossible, and (ii) making the leader better oﬀ as compared to the no transfer option, does
not exists, then a revolution recursively occurs at each time period.
There must therefore also exist an intermediate outcome where the ruler ﬁnds it optimal to co-opt subjects
in order that the revolution is not carried. In this situation, the ruler needs to dispatch gifts to some potential
protesters so that the pool of opponents falls short of reaching the revolutionary critical force. Given that the
leader co-opts enough subjects to avert a revolution, any individual i in the community will refrain from joining the
uprising if the expected utility of participating to a failed rebellion is less than the expected utility of not rebelling.2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 13
In case no revolution occurs, since the distribution of resources remains unaltered from one period to the other, the
same decisions must be adopted at both time periods. The stationarity that follows from the markov hypothesis






⇔ pi − z(πτ) > xi (7)
Provided the ruler wants to remain in power, he still has to decide whom to co-opt given that this last inequality
gives the individual cooptation price of subject i. If the leader bribes rather weak subjects, the individual transfer
that keeps them silent is small compared to the equivalent amount the ruler should transfer to powerful individuals.
The trade-oﬀ, however, rests in that the number of weaker individuals that must be co-opted for the critical
revolutionary mass not to be reached is bigger to the analogous number of powerful individuals.
Optimal co-optation strategy
The aim of the ruler is to make sure that after buying-oﬀ some subjects, the remaining protesters are just not
enough to perform a revolution, meaning that their aggregate power is smaller than the critical revolutionary force,
Π. In order to keep track of the analysis, we have represented on Figure (2) one such possible co-optation strategy.
In this scenario, the ruler co-opts all the subjects whose power is comprised between ¯ pc and ¯ pb. These individuals
represent a share (πC − πB) of the total population. This implies that after the πBn more powerful subjects have
protested, then next most powerful non co-opted individuals have a power slightly smaller than ¯ pC. As one can see
on Figure (2), the move of the ‘power line’, f(π), towards the origin (g(π)) implies that after applying this speciﬁc
co-optation strategy, πE percent of the community eventually takes the streets. We can therefore deduce that when
applying this particular bribing strategy, the ruler still faces a total opposition equal to the sum of the two shaded
areas, 0¯ pBπB and πBbEπE. If we impose that the shaded area equals Π so as to prevent a revolution, the ruler’s
problem is then a cost minimization one consisting in deciding which individuals to bribe given this constraint.
Since the minimal amount that deters individual i from protesting is equal to ¯ pi − z(πE), the total cost of bribing
the individuals whose power lies between ¯ pB and ¯ pC equals to the area ABCD.
Having explained the problem in a detailed manner, let us minimize the leader’s expenses. The total co-optation
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Figure 2: Some co-coptation strategy
















We thus need to compute the values of πB and πC so as to have the cost as a function of a single choice variable,
πE.
Notice ﬁrst that since we have not altered the distribution of the individuals’ power on the [0, ¯ pB] interval, f(π)
and g(π) respectively describe the power distribution on the [0,πB] and [0,πF] domains. It follows that those two
lines must have the same slope, ¯ p, but a diﬀerent intercept. If we denote the intercept of g(π) by ¯ p0, given that
g(π), is such that g(πE) = z(πE) by construction (since we do not want any subject after the πEnth individual to
protest), we can deduce that:
¯ p0 = z(πE) + πE¯ p (10)
We equally know that πC −πB, the total percentage of co-opted subjects, is equal to 1−πF because of the parallel
move of the power line. This means that:




Combining this last equation with (10), we deduce that:
πC − πB = 1 − πE −
z(πE)
¯ p
(12)2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 15
If we want to depict the revolutionary critical mass Π in this graph, we need to divide it by n since the x-axis













¯ p0 − π¯ p

ndπ (13)



























Since this equation gives us the cost of preventing a revolution as a function of the percentage of the community









− (1 − πE)
i
(16)
The reputation function being decreasing in πE, C(πE) is increasing in πE if the square-bracketed term is negative
as well. For this to be the case, we need that z(πE) ≤ (1−πE)¯ p. We know by construction that (1−πE)¯ p
0
= z(πE).
Since the co-optation strategy shifts the power line towards the origin (from πB on), we have that z(πE) = ¯ p0−πE¯ p <
¯ p − πE¯ p. We conclude that
∂C(πE)
∂πE ≥ 0, with strict equality if z(πE) 6= 0.
Having showed that the cost of co-optation is increasing in πE, the ruler selects the smallest πE compatible with
πE ≥ 0, πB ≥ 0, and πC < 1. Deriving both πB as given in equation (14), and πC as given in equation (12) with
respect to πE, we show in the Appendix that ∂πB
∂πE < 0, and ∂πC
∂πE < 0. Moreover, by using those same results we
obtain that
∂(πC−πB)
∂πE < 0. This implies that since it is optimal for the ruler to select the smallest possible value of
πE, and that the smaller is πE, the bigger are πB and πC (with the gap separating them reducing), it must be that
πE = πB since taking πE < πB implies the co-optation of individuals that would not protest given the equilibrium
social sanction of protesting z(πE).
Proposition 1. When the strongest rebel replaces the king in case of a revolution, the latter co-opts the weakest
opponents among the subset of subjects powerful enough to publicly oppose the regime.2 THE DOMINATION OF THE FIERCEST. 16
Figure 3: Equilibrium co-optation strategy
On Figure (3) we have graphically represented the equilibrium strategy of the ruler when he dispatches person-
alized gifts to a share (πC − πE) of the community. The total cost of this operation equals to the triangle EBC,
and we now derive the exact value of this cost.
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Solving (18) for πE yields:
πE = 1 −
s
n¯ p − 2Π/n
n¯ p
(19)
Having computed πE, we can deduce the value of pB:
pB = (1 − πE)¯ p (20)
We are left with the computation of πB which is obtained by ﬁnding the percentile of the uniformily distributed
population such that the (1 − πC)th subject has a power equal to z(πB) (i.e. after πB% of the population have
protested the next most powerful individual is indiﬀerent between joining the revolt or not). Hence,
(1 − πC)¯ p = z(πE) ⇒ πC = 1 −
z(πE)
¯ p
(21)3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 17



















Lastly, for the cooptation strategy to be the equilibrium one, we need that
P
i∈C ri ≤ δr (see Result 2).
3 The Dominant Coalition
In the previous section we assumed that when a revolution succeeds, the strongest rebel becomes the new ruler. We
now want to allow the dominant coalition members, i.e. the transfer beneﬁciaries, to all have the same possibility
of being the successors in the event of a successful revolution. Moreover, we shall assume that the dominant
coalition’s members have no problem in coordinating their actions; we adopt a cooperative stance for these agents.
For a revolution to be averted, therefore, it is necessary that the coalition is stable in the sense that no partition of
the dominant coalition can grant the deviating members a higher payoﬀ. We can anticipate the results at this stage
and claim that the dominant coalition is such that if all members of the dominant coalition refrain from joining the
protest, no revolution occurs. The coalition subjects’ decision regarding the protest is determined by comparing
the expected payoﬀ of a certain revolution with the status quo payoﬀ. If rt
i 6= 0, meaning i belongs to the dominant











Indeed, in t + 1 the rebelling agent expects to obtain with probability Li the expected payoﬀ of being a leader,
while with the complementary probability he will be treated as in the previous time period. We assume that all
members of the dominant coalition have the same likelihood of assuming the leader’s role in the next time period.
The present framework signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the no-coordination scenario since the identity of the clients
aﬀects their payoﬀ expectations, which in turn determine the individual co-optation price. Assume it is optimal for
the ruler in time period t to buy-oﬀ a particular subset of the community. If this leader is deposed, the same class
of individuals will be co-opted by the new leader in t+1 because of the assumed stationarity the markov hypothesis
imposes in the players’ strategies. This means that if the ruler behaves as in the previous section by selectively
picking the weakest subjects among the potential protesters, this particular class of individuals (i.e. whose power3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 18
is comprised between pB and z(πE) as shown on Figure 3) know that with unit probability they will be given
a privileged treatment at any future time period. And since transferring them private favors empowers them to
provoke a revolution, those subjects will require a gift whose value lies between their expected payoﬀ as leaders, and
their expected payoﬀ as privileged members of the community. An alternative strategy that needs to be considered
now consists in reducing the expected payoﬀ of the subjects by initially selecting them on a random basis. The
required transfer for those subjects not to revolt is then smaller since their payoﬀ expectation in the event they do
not become leader after a successful revolution embeds the likelihood they don’t belong to the dominant coalition
in t + 1. Our resolution strategy consists in ﬁrst determining the superior strategy when selecting the players in a
strategic manner, and then comparing this outcome to the alternative strategy of randomly selecting clients.
3.1 Strategic selection of the clients





i, with the s superscript designating the strategic selection strategy. This same agent,
however, has the power to provoke a revolution since all agents in the dominant coalition, except the leader himself,


















Agent i will therefore prefer not provoking a revolution if (25) is bigger than (24) which means that the minimal






1 − δ(1 − Ls
i)
(26)
The clients all receive the same gift because their exit option is the same (i.e. whichever member of the dominant
coalition provokes a revolution, at equilibrium all dominant coalition members obtain the same expected payoﬀ).
We thus have that vs
L = r −
P
i∈C xs
i = r − ns
Cxs
i, with ns
C standing for the number of clients under the strategic









(27)3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 19
Since we assume each member of the dominant coalition to be equally likely to become the new king after a
revolution succeeds, we have that Ls
i = 1/ns







We therefore deduce that when the king decides to co-opt ns
C subjects, his payoﬀ equals:
vs
L =





From (28) we understand that the required amount of the gift for a subject not to join the rebellion is decreasing
in the number of clients. This implies that, on the one hand, the king has an incentive to reduce the size of the
dominant coalition so as to contain the number of gifts, while, on the other hand, there is an opposing force pushing
him to increase the size of the dominant coalition.
We can easily show that dvs
L/dnS
C < 0, meaning that the above trade-oﬀ is lifted and that the king will seek to
minimize the size of the dominant coalition. We showed earlier that the size of the clan decreases when co-opting
stronger individuals. This implies that if the ruler seeks to minimize the clientele’s size, he will buy-oﬀ the most
powerful subjects in his community. On Figure (4) we have graphed this situation when the critical revolutionary
mass Π is equal to the shaded area 0¯ p0EπE. As the ruler co-opts the πC − πE most powerful share of the total
population (which also equals to (1 − πD)n), the strength of the most powerful non co-opted individual equals ¯ p0.
Indeed, all the subjects whose power lies between ¯ p and ¯ p
0
have been co-opted by the king.
To evaluate the cost of this strategy, we need to determine the diﬀerence between πC and πE, (πC − πE)n is
equal to the total number of clients. We know that g(πE) = z(πE), since πE is the percentage of protesters at
equilibrium. We thus have:
g (πE) = ¯ p0 − ¯ pπE = z(πE) (30)
And since πD =
¯ p
0





The percentage of agents to be bribed under the strategic selection scenario, πs, is thus given by the next
expression:
πs = πC − πE = 1 − πD = 1 −
z(πE)
¯ p
− πE (32)3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 20
Figure 4: Strategically co-opting the powerful
This equally means that the value of πE allows us to evaluate the cost of the cooptation strategy.














Had we an explicit formulation of z(π), (33) would give us πE which would allow us to compute πs by using (32).







r(δ + (1 − δ)nπs)
(1 − δ)(δ + nπs)
(34)






r , δ , n , ¯ p , Π

+ + − − +
We can therefore state the following proposition
Proposition 2. When the clients (together with the king) form a dominant coalition and that the ruler strategically
chooses the gifts’ beneﬁciaries, the latter’s payoﬀ is increasing in the value of the available pie as well as in the
weight assigned to future time periods. A bigger community size decreases the patron’s utility as a consequence of
the bigger number of clients. The stronger the subjects (or the weaker the ruler), the higher their expected utility
from revolution, and the lower the utility of the king.3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 21
While the ﬁrst two results barely need any comment, the remaining ones deserve some further explanations.
Regarding the community size, it’s eﬀect seems fairely intuitive since more subjects imply a bigger resistance and,
therefore, more individuals to co-opt if a revolution is to be averted. We must not neglect, however, that there is a
force pushing in the opposite direction, since, as the dominant coalition grows larger, the individual payoﬀs to the
clients decrease. It is therefore the case that the former eﬀect is stronger to the second one. Not surprisingly, when
subjects’ strength relative to the central regime’s power is higher, the individual claims of the clients are larger,
and, therefore, the burden of sustaining a clientele is heavier.
Let us now turn to the king’s alternative strategy of randomly selecting his clients.
3.2 Random selection of the clients
The king may instead reduce the claims of his clients by distributing productive resources in a random fashion. A
graphical support is provided on Figure (5) where, among the π
0
C% more powerful subjects, the leader randomly
















% of the π
0
C% more powerful subjects will protest,
managing to gather a cumulated force of FP = Π, and thus falling short of overthrowing the ruler. To simplify















Before computing the optimal number of such clients, nr
C = πrn, we shall derive the individual payoﬀ those
randomly selected clients receive.
If a client chooses to rebel, his utility is no longer given by equation (23). Since the ruler randomly selects his
clients when ﬁrst acceding to power, any newly enthroned leader will adopt the same co-optation strategy given
that the state of the world is the same in any time period following a successful revolution. Provided, however,
that a revolution occurs in time t, and that a member of the dominant coalition has not become leader in t + 1,
the probability the latter does not belong to the new dominant coalition equals (1 − πR). Therefore, the expected













Since the expected utility of supporting the regime is given by (25), the minimal gift that keeps agent i disciplined3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 22








C − 1 + Lr
i)
(37)
In the random selection scenario, the probability that a client becomes the new king after a successful revolution,
Lr
i, is equal to 1/nr
C, with nr




πr [n + δ(n(1 − πr) + 1)]
(38)
We therefore conclude that when the king randomly co-opts nπr clients, his instantaneous payoﬀ equals:
vr
L =
r(n + δ(1 − nπr)
n + nδ + δ − nδπr (39)




















, thus allowing us to write the following equation:











And since the protesters’ aggregate power, FP, is equated to Π, the percentage of rebels, π
0




























n(¯ p + z(π
0
E))
(42)3 THE DOMINANT COALITION 23




C we know that the













Hence, the percentage of subjects to co-opt under the random selection mechanism, πr, equals:








The life-time utility of the king when applying the random selection strategy equals:
V r
L =
r(n − δnπr + δ)
(1 − δ)(n + nδ + δ − nδπr)
(45)





r , δ , n , ¯ p , Π

+ + − − +
Proposition 3. When the clients (together with the king) form a dominant coalition and that the ruler randomly
chooses the gifts’ beneﬁciaries, the latter’s payoﬀ is increasing in the value of the available pie as well as in the
weight assigned to future time periods. A bigger community size decreases the patron’s utility as a consequence of
the bigger number of clients. The stronger the subjects (or the weaker the ruler), the higher their expected utility
from revolution, and the lower the utility of the king.
Whether the ruler selects randomly or selectively his clients, we have shown that the comparative statics results
are qualitatively the same. The last task of the analysis, therefore, consists in indentifying how each of the model’s
parameters push the ruler to opt for either selection mechanism.
3.3 Optimal Co-optation Strategy
Whichever clients’ selection mechanism the ruler decides to apply, the cost of co-optation is a function of both the
number of clients, and the size of the individual gifts. With respect to the ﬁrst dimension, we can state the next
result:
Result 3. The number of clients is smaller under a strategic selection than under a random selection of the gift
beneﬁciaries.4 DISCUSSION 24
Proof in the Appendix.
While Result 3 highlights the king’s incentives to strategically select his clients, the leader faces nevertheless a
tradeoﬀ regarding the co-optation strategy:
Result 4. The size of the individual gifts is smaller under a random selection than under a strategic selection of
the clients.
Proof in the Appendix.
The next expression, that we derive in the Appendix, is helpful to compare the utility of the king under these
two alternative strategies:
V r
L Q V s
L ⇔ 1 − πs > nπs(1 − πr) (46)
While (1 − πs) is larger than (1 − πr), nπs is necessarily bigger than unity, thus implying that this inequality
could hold either way. This expression allows us to state the last proposition of this paper:
Proposition 4. The king is more likely to selectively co-opt his clients, rather than randomly, if the required
proportion of the community to be co-opted is signiﬁcantly smaller under the former mechanism than under the
latter, and if the number of subjects is small.
4 Discussion
In this paper we have developed a model of patronage where the king of a community averts being deposed by
co-opting subjects. Each subject is endowed with some power/strength, and if the dissident’s aggregate strength is
bigger to some critical revolutionary mass, the king is ousted. We assume that expressing one’s opposition to the
regime is gratifying and that the utility derived by the dissidents is proportional to their individual strength. The
subjects not joining the protest, however, ostracize the dissidents thus decreasing the latters’ well-being.
Two scenarios have been considered. In the ﬁrst one we suppose the ﬁercest dissident replaces the king if a
revolution succeeds. We have shown that the king’s optimal co-optation scheme consists in buying-oﬀ the weakest
subjects that would otherwise oppose the regime. The strongest subjects’ co-optation price is too high, while the
weakest subjects do not pose any threat. In a second scenario we assume that any dissident may replace the king if
a revolution succeeds. The king’s optimal strategy consists in either co-opting the strongest potential dissidents, or4 DISCUSSION 25
else in randomly choosing clients. While the former strategy requires a smaller clientele, the latter involves smaller
individual transfers because of the lower payoﬀ expectations if a revolution succeeds. Indeed, when the clientele is
chosen selectively, clients know that irrespectively of a protest’s outcome, their belonging to the dominant coalition
is not jeopardized. The randomly co-opted subjects, however, may not enjoy the on-going privileges if a new king
is enthroned.
The patron-client relationships modelled in this paper have long shaped social order in the West. As emphasized
by Tilly (1990), to maintain control over widely dispersed populations, rulers “co-opted landlords and clergy,
subordinated the peasantry, built extensive bureaucracies, and stiﬂed their bourgeoisie” (Tilly 1990). As a matter
of fact, failing to possess a monopoly of power, rulers needed to open their ﬁefdoms’ resources to a strong enough
dominant coalition “to put down possible combinations of non-elites or external groups” (North et al. 2007).
When considering societies that are organized around a powerful individual, we have in mind “primitive societies”
where brute physical force is necessary to counter individual agressions. Thus our predictions are that tribal societal
organizations are more likely to feature coalitions of the head and of mild subjects, the most powerful opponents
being purposefully kept aside. This reasoning can bring answers at higher levels of societal organization: how are
clans’ coalitions formed in tribal led societies?
The model we have developed considers a ruler whose repressive apparatus is taken as given, and who can
ﬁne-tune the second tool at his disposal for preventing revolutions, namely the size of the gifts he makes. We ﬁrst
showed that when agents completely fail to coordinate their actions, the ruler exploits this coordination failure
and selectively rewards the weaker individuals of his community that would have taken part in the protests in the
absence of the leader’s intervention. When assuming, however, that the members of the dominant coalition, deﬁned
as the group of individuals receiving the king’s favours, can perfectly coordinate their actions, we reach diﬀerent
conclusions. We are able to show that the strategic co-optation of the most powerful elements of the community
may be optimal for the ruler, provided that the most powerful individuals in the community are not too strong.
Alternatively, the leader ﬁnds it optimal to randomly select his clients. By acting in the latter fashion the ruler
eﬀectively reduces the bargaining power of the strongest elements that are being co-opted. The trade oﬀ the ruler
then faces is wheter to strategically select his client and then oﬀer big gifts to few clients, or to randomly construct
the dominant coalition, in which case individual gifts are more modest but the number of beneﬁciaries is larger.4 DISCUSSION 26
The mechanism behind this trade-oﬀ is the following. When the random selection strategy is applied, a revolution
cannot be achieved by a small group of hardcore opponents, but will rather take the form of a popular uprising -
meaning that those agents whose power is the highest have but a small claim in the overall pie. If, however, these
individuals are compensated in an appropriate manner, the revolution can be averted. When considering, next, a
more rebel-oriented society, a small proportion of the population constitutes a real danger to the ruler, since the
hard-core opponents are able to spark a revolution. The “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) being
very small, these individuals’ bargaining power increases accordingly. The corollary of this result is the increased
required individual transfers for these clients to remain disciplined. Thus, if the model’s parameters confer too
much bargaining power to some particularly disruptive agents, the ruler may choose to randomly select his clients,
rather than embrace the mighty.
In the present work we have not dealt with the transition for societies controlled by an allmighty king to situations
where a dominant coalition is in charge of aﬀairs. We therefore take as granted the outcome of the transition that
has received various interpretations (North, 1989; Tilly, 1990; Grossman, 2002; North et al., 2007).
To the most ‘autocratic’ end of the political continuum we can certainly place those ruthless regimes that
bloomed soon after declaring independence from colonial rule. If we think of Mobutu, Idi Amin, or more recently
Robert Mugabe, these tyrants have ruled their country as absolut monarchs by dispatching generous gifts to their
small sized court, when the bulk of their people have been struggling for their survival. Surprisingly, however,
instead of receiving an angry welcome by frustrated mobs during their visits around the country, the subjects’
signs of admiration and devotion legitimized their behaviour. Those three regimes certainly exhibited a very strong
military that acted as a deterrent to any opposition movement (high Π), and that certainly equally exacerbated the
tendency to denounce dissidents (second-order punishment). But, as our discussion makes clear, no state apparatus
is strong and eﬃcient enough to secure power on its own. We believe that the colonial burden of these and
many other ex-colonies must have pushed down the subjects’ political preferences after their intense and prolonged
exposition to unfair treatments that were eventually deemed fair. The rent seeking behavior of many african rulers
is therefore considered as legitimate by the ones being robbed, hence untying the central power’s hands. We believe
that it is a general feature that autrocatic modes of governance are much more likely to emerge in societies where
the heavy cultural burden dictates individuals not to question the ongoing social hierarchy. Take for instance the4 DISCUSSION 27
ex-communist block. The fate of its citizens after the disintegration of the USSR has varied immensely since some
countries have already joined the European Union, while others have seen the re-instauration of a despot after
having experienced a short period of power-vacuum. We argue that the mentality of the russian people, that have
invariably through history been in a constant quest of security and stability and that have always eulogized the
strong, has undoubtly contributed to Vladimir Putin, sometimes designated as ‘the Tsar’, establishing his dictatorial
powers while shrinking his clientele to the tiniest possible size.
Moving along the political continuum towards less autocratic regimes we can locate somewhere between the two
edges the Iranian regime or Venezuela. Both Ahmadinejad and Chavez are populist leaders that have secured the
support of a much widder pool of subjects than the autocracies just described, without this implying, however, that
the dissidents can freely express their opposition to the central regime, or that everyone has access to the country’s
wealth. Censorship is widespread and the opposition is extremely careful in the steps it takes. There is, however,
internal strife. Highly ranked oﬃcials in Iran dare question the regime’s decisions at times and the recent alienation
from the west and the democratic values has intensiﬁed the ﬁrmness of the opposition. Similarily, Chavez recently
tried to extend his presidential powers, just to face a cruel deception when the population being asked to express
its opinion through a referendum blocked the project. With regards to our model, the equilibrium best matching
those situations is the random selection of the clientele. Indeed, the leader’s subjects are much more reluctant to
exploitation, which in turn pushes the central power to look for alternative allies to the mightiest elements of the
population so as to mitigate their bargaining power. By adopting a more populist mode of governance, such a
regime exposes itself to a wider public expression of discontentment that is orchestrated by those most expressive
elements of the society.A APPENDIX 28
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Result 2
Proof. Because of the stationarity of the markov strategies, if the ruler ﬁnds it optimal to transfer a vector of gifts
~ x
0
such that FP|~ x
0 ≤ Π, then at any subsequent time period this same vector will be transfered. This implies that







If, however, the ruler chooses to keep all the pot for himself, he just earns r once. Comparing those two terms, we




i∈C < δr. Whenever this condition is veriﬁed, that the
vector of gifts ~ r
0













is an equilibrium vector of gifts. If, however, this vector is non-feasilbe, a
revolution occurs anyway and no gift is transferred at equilibrium.
A.2 Comparative statics for the no-coordination scenario




















































































¯ p + 1
z(πE)0
¯ p + 1
> 1
This last inequality is impossible to be satisﬁed since if πB > πE, then pπB < z(πE), meaning that the ruler is
co-opting at least one individual that would not protest if he was not co-opted. Hence ∂πB
∂πE < 0.












We know from above that ∂πB
∂πE . We then have ∂πC
∂πE < 0 if 1 +
z(πE)
0
¯ p > 0 ⇔ ¯ p > −z(πE)0. And since ¯ p is the slope
of g(π), that g(πE) = z(πE), that z(π)0 < 0, and that z(π)00 < 0, we must have ¯ p > −z(πE)0. Hence ∂πC
∂πE < 0.










A.3 Comparative statics in the dominant coalition scenario under the strategic se-
lection strategy.





rδ (δ + 2nπs − nπsδ)
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Using the value of the percentage of agents to be bribed under the strategic selection of clients, πs, as given by






∂n . Given, however, that πE(n) is an implicit function, we set expression
(33) equal to zero and deﬁne Φ as:



























0πE + ¯ pπE
(A-1)
The ﬁrst (bracketed) multiplicative term is positive because, at πE, the slope of z(πE), z(πE)
0
, is necessarily
less steep than the slope of f(π), ¯ p. For this same reason the denominator of the second multiplicative term is also












































πE + ¯ p
 < 0A APPENDIX 30
With the sign of this expression following from ¯ p > −z (πE)
0
.




∂¯ p < 0.
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 > 0





A.4 Comparative statics in the dominant coalition scenario under the random selec-
tion strategy.
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Using the value of the percentage of agents to be bribed under the strategic selection of clients, πr, as given by










∂n . Given, however, that π
0
E(n) is an implicit function, we set expression
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less steep than the slope of f(π), ¯ p.
Regarding the second multiplicative term, its sign will depend on the sign of the denominator, since the numerator





We hence deduce that ∂π
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∂¯ p < 0.














































A.5 Comparative Statics for the Optimal Co-optation Strategy
Proof of Result 3
Proof. The ﬁrst step to establish this proof consist in showing that π
0





, we can deduce Result 3 is true.
Notice that the slope of g
0












E. Next, since Π has the same value under the two selection mechanisms, if πE is such that 33 is true,
then, given that the y-origin of g(π)
0






(π)dπ = Π/n only if π
0
E < πE.A APPENDIX 32
Proof of Result 4
Proof. When comparing equations 28 and 38, Result 4 holds if:
δ + nπs < πr (n + δ [n + 1 − nπr])
Since πs < πr, nπs < nπr, implying that the above inequality is veriﬁed if:
δ < πr (δ [n + 1 − nπr])
⇔ nπr > 1
And this last inequality necessarily holds for, otherwise, no subject is co-opted.
Derivation of Expression (46)
The king’s payoﬀ is higher under the strategic selection mechanism if:
r − nπsxs










⇔ δ/πs > nδ − nδπr + δ
⇔ 1 − πs > nπs(1 − πr)REFERENCES 33
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